The Challenge of Free Will and Artificial Intelligence: From Metaphysical Denial to Cyber Determinism and the Threat to Human Nobility
Subject Areas : Islamic theology
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Keywords: Free will, Artificial intelligence (AI), Cyber determinism, Cognitive sciences, Human nobility (ashrafiyyat al-insān), Al-amr bayn al-amrayn (the intermediate position), Shakleh (inner disposition).,
Abstract :
The issue of human free will is one of the most fundamental topics in philosophy, theology, and ethics, serving as the basis for human distinction and superiority over other beings. With the advent of artificial intelligence and the pursuit of strong (general) AI, novel challenges have emerged in this regard. This article, employing a descriptive-analytical method and a theological approach, investigates three levels of these challenges: first, the theoretical denial of human free will based on findings from cognitive sciences and AI predictive models; second, the practical restriction of free will in the form of "technological determinism" and its more advanced manifestation, "cyber determinism"; and third, the hypothetical challenge of AI itself possessing free will and its theological implications for "human nobility" (ashrafiyyat al-insān). The research findings indicate that AI predictive models never entail the negation of metaphysical free will; rather, they are merely based on behavioral patterns arising from nature and habit. Concepts such as "repentance" (tawbah) and "breaking the pattern" constitute the most important empirical counter-evidence for free will. Moreover, in the face of cyber determinism, the fundamental solution is not the rejection of technology but the strengthening of existential religiosity, moral virtues, and the Qur'anic concept of "Shakleh" (inner disposition) within the framework of "al-amr bayn al-amrayn" (the intermediate position between determinism and absolute delegation). Finally, even assuming the realization of genuine free will for AI, human nobility remains defensible by relying on the divine breath of the soul (nafkhah min rūḥī), the station of vicegerency (khilāfah), and the acceptance of the divine "trust" (amānah). The ultimate conclusion is that AI, at best, attains "functional free will" (not existential free will), and the question of its free will, more than a technical issue, serves as a mirror for recognizing the truth of the human being.
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